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A rational secret sharing scheme is a game in which each party responsible for reconstructing a
secret tries to maximize his utility by obtaining the secret alone. Quantum secret sharing schemes,
either derived from quantum teleportation or from quantum error correcting code, do not succeed
when we assume rational participants. This is because all existing quantum secret sharing schemes
consider that the secret is reconstructed by a party chosen by the dealer. In this paper, for the
first time, we propose a quantum secret sharing scheme which is resistant to rational parties. The
proposed scheme is fair (everyone gets the secret), correct and achieves strict Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Secret sharing is an important primitive in cryptog-
raphy. It can be considered as a special case of secure
multiparty computation [1–3] which has applications in
electronic voting, cloud computing, online auction etc.
Recently, significant effort has been given towards bridg-
ing the gap between two apparently unrelated domains,
namely, cryptography and game theory [2–4]. Cryptog-
raphy deals with the ‘worst case’ scenario making the
protocols secure against malicious behavior of a party.
However, in game theoretic perspective, a protocol is de-
signed against the rational deviation of a party.
In rational domain there is no concept of trust. Ra-
tional players are classified as neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’.
They participate in the game with a motivation to maxi-
mize their utility. In cryptography, one may consider this
as a special type of attack vector. However, this does not
impose any special condition on adversary, it rather adds
more flexibility to the adversary.
In [5] it was commented that quantum secret sharing
can be treated as a game between the legitimate parties.
Very recently, Brunner and Linden [6] showed a deep link
between quantum physics and game theory. By bring-
ing quantum mechanics into the game, they showed that
players who can use quantum resources, such as entan-
gled quantum particles, can outperform classical players.
This is because of the fact that, in classical domain, the
security depends on some computational hardness and
thus is conditional. On the other hand, in quantum do-
main, the security comes from the laws of physics and
thus is unconditional. In this paper, for the first time,
we introduce the rationality concept of game theory in
quantum secret sharing.
A (t, n) or t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing
scheme [7, 8] comprises the distribution of shares of a
secret s among n players P1, . . . , Pn, such that at least t
of these players must communicate their shares to each
other to reconstruct the secret. An example of such a se-
cret sharing scheme is Shamir’s scheme [7] that uses the
concept of polynomial interpolation for generation and
distribution of shares of the secret by a dealer and subse-
quent reconstruction of the secret by the players. Players
that are ‘good’ or ‘honest’ cooperate to reconstruct the
secret, while players that are ‘bad’ or malicious do not
cooperate [9]. So, for successful reconstruction of the se-
cret, at most (n− t) players can be ‘bad’.
In classical threshold secret sharing, Halpern and
Teague [9] introduced the concept of rational players.
Each rational party wishes to learn the secret while allow-
ing as few others as possible to learn the secret. Halpern
and Teague [9] showed that in the presence of rational
players, Shamir’s scheme fails. Specifically, no rational
player has the incentive to send his share during secret
reconstruction. From the viewpoint of each player Pi,
either (t − 1) other players send their shares or they do
not. If they send, then Pi, even without sending his own
share, can reconstruct the secret for himself without al-
lowing these (t − 1) players to reconstruct. If they do
not send, then none of the players can reconstruct the
secret. So from each player Pi’s point of view, not send-
ing his share weakly dominates sending his share. Thus
the Nash equilibrium achieved in Shamir’s secret shar-
ing corresponds to the case when nobody sends anything
to each other. To mitigate this problem, the authors
of [9] introduced the concept of rational secret sharing
(RSS). Its application in secure multiparty computation
is known as rational multi-party computation or RMPC
and has been an active area of research [10–17] in recent
times.
The idea of quantum secret sharing (QSS) of a single
qubit was first due to Hillery et al. [18] using three and
four qubit GHZ states. Later, this process was investi-
gated by Karlsson et al. [19] using three particle entan-
glement, Cleve et al. [20] using a process similar to error
correction and Zheng [21] using W state. The QSS of
an arbitrary two-qubit state was proposed by Deng et
al. [22] using two GHZ states. QSS using cluster states
was demonstrated by Nie [23], Panigrahi [24, 25] and
Han [26]. Recently, two qubit QSS was discussed using
2arbitrary pure or mixed resource states [27] and asym-
metric multipartite state [28]. Note that in t-out-of-n
QSS, the dealer chooses to reveal the secret to a specific
subset of t parties and not to any arbitrary subset of t
parties.
A. QSS with Rational Adversaries
In QSS, all the parties are ‘good’ or ‘honest’ as they
have agreed to reconstruct the secret to the party (or par-
ties) chosen by the dealer. However, if we impose rational
behavior of the participants in QSS, it is quite natural for
the last player, who generates the secret, to quit with the
secret alone. Hence, the other players always prefer not
to give their shares (either classical bits or quantum bits)
and hence the traditional QSS scheme fails if the players
behave rationally. Like classical case, one may consider
this as a special type of attack vector in quantum se-
cret sharing. In the context of quantum secret sharing,
it is an important attack vector to consider. However,
this does not impose any special condition on adversary,
it rather empowers the adversary with more flexibility.
In this paper, for the first time, we propose a quantum
secret sharing scheme that resists this kind of attack vec-
tor and forces the participants to send the shares, though
they are rational in nature. We call this scheme a quan-
tum rational secret sharing (QRSS) scheme.
In classical domain, the adversary that controls a
player may be computationally bounded, but in quan-
tum domain the adversary is always assumed to have
unbounded computational power. Because of this, we as-
sume a computationally unbounded adversary through-
out the entire paper and modify the security notions in
this direction.
B. Security Issues
In classical RSS protocols, two type of settings are con-
sidered. One is called fail-stop setting and the other is
known as Byzantine setting. In fail-stop setting, a player
may abort early in an attempt to obtain the secret alone
but does not send false shares of the secret. Whereas in
Byzantine setting, a player can behave arbitrarily, i.e.,
he can abort early or can fabricate a false share.
For share generation, rational multiparty computation
exploits the idea of Shamir’s secret sharing, the security
of which comes from the interpolation theorem [7, 29].
Thus, it does not depend on some unproven hypothesis
on computational hardness. However, in [29] Tompa and
Woll showed that in Shamir’s scheme, any (t − 1) par-
ticipants can fabricate false shares in the motivation to
deceive the t-th participant to believe in a legal but in-
correct secret. In other words, Shamir’s basic scheme is
not secure against Byzantine players.
One straightforward solution to this problem is to send
signed shares by the distributor (dealer) to the partici-
pants. Another approach is to use verifiable secret shar-
ing [30]. Note that both these approaches are based upon
unproven assumptions such as the intractability of inte-
ger factorization or the existence of secure encryption
schemes.
Interestingly, Tompa and Woll proposed a scheme [29]
that mitigates the hidden problem of cheating in Shamir’s
secret sharing without any unproven assumption. They
showed that the probability of undetected cheating can
be made less than ǫ, for any ǫ > 0, by suitably choosing
a large prime (that depends on ǫ) as the modulus of the
underlying field.
Thus, the security issues of classical RSS can be sub-
divided into the following notions: 1) security of the un-
derlying secret secret sharing, 2) security of a signature
scheme, 3) security against rational players. The security
issues of 1 and 2 have been discussed in a number of liter-
atures [7, 29, 31]. This is why the works on rational secret
sharing [9–17] have concentrated only on the security of
the rational part, that is formalized in terms of fairness,
correctness and Nash equilibrium [11]. In this paper, we
follow the same approach in the quantum domain.
In quantum domain, we impose rationality issues on
the top of the quantum secret sharing model which ex-
ploits quantum error correcting code. Thus, the secu-
rity of the secret sharing part comes from the security
of the quantum error correcting code, specifically CSS
code [20, 32, 33]. Note that as we exploit the quantum
error correcting code to encode the secret, no unautho-
rized party can extract any information by subverting
one or more authorized parties [20, 33].
Further, the existing RSS literatures [10–12, 14–16]
deal with various flavours of Nash equilibrium. As we as-
sume computationally unbounded adversary in the quan-
tum domain, we consider strict Nash equilibrium here.
In classical RSS, the dealer signs each share so that no
player can give out wrong shares to others. However, in
the quantum setting the scenario is different. Typically,
quantum signature schemes consider signing either clas-
sical messages [34] or quantum message string with inde-
pendent qubits [35]. In these works, there is no concept
of entanglement among the distributed shares, whereas
in our proposed scheme, the shares are entangled. It is
not yet known how to sign such qubits which contain the
information of the secret, as any type of measurement
on that qubits will destroy the entanglement and hence
the information related to the secret. For this reason,
we assume that a rational player in the quantum setting
is fail-stop by nature, i.e., he may abort early towards
the motivation to get the secret alone, but does not send
false shares of the secret.
In quantum domain, it is very natural for a player to
measure his share as soon as he gets it. However, in this
work, we encode the secret by CSS code which takes care
of arbitrary error. Thus measuring his qubit in an arbi-
trary basis gives no advantage to the player. Even with
unconditional power of computation, the quantum adver-
sary extracts no information about the secret. Moreover,
3if he measures the share, he will lose the information
stored in the qubit. Thus no player has any incentive to
measure his qubit(s) and each player communicates each
share as it is received from the dealer.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly describe classical rational se-
cret sharing and discuss the concepts of rationality, fair-
ness, correctness and equilibrium used in this work. We
also extend these concepts in the quantum domain.
The dealer in a classical rational secret sharing (RSS)
protocol is honest and can be online or offline. An on-
line dealer remains available throughout the secret re-
construction protocol, whereas an offline dealer becomes
unavailable after distributing the shares of the secret.
Note that an online dealer is not very practical as he
repeatedly interacts with the players and such a dealer
can directly provide the secret to the players. In 2008,
Kol and Naor [14] discussed rational secret sharing in the
non-simultaneous channel model and in the presence of
an offline dealer, in an information theoretic setting. Al-
most all the subsequent works [11, 12, 16, 17] on rational
secret sharing assumed the dealer to be offline.
Rational secret sharing proceeds in two phases: 1)
share generation and distribution and 2) secret recon-
struction.
Share generation and distribution: If the dealer is on-
line, then at the beginning of each round, he distributes
to each player Pi the share of the actual secret with prob-
ability γ or that of a fake secret with probability (1− γ).
The value of γ is kept secret from the parties and is de-
pendent on the utility values of the parties [9, 13]. An
offline dealer distributes to each party Pi a list of shares,
one of which is that of the actual secret s and the re-
maining of fake secrets [12, 14, 16]. The position r of
this actual share in the lists is not revealed to the play-
ers and is chosen according to a geometric distribution
G(γ), where the parameter γ in turn depends on the util-
ity values of players. The dealer generates shares using
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
Secret Reconstruction: In the jth round of commu-
nication, each player Pi (either simultaneously or non-
simultaneously) broadcasts or sends individually to each
of the other players (in presence of synchronous, point-
to-point channels) the share sij corresponding to that
round. The shares are signed by the dealer. Hence, no
player can give out false shares undetected and the only
possible action of a player in a round is to either 1) send
the message or 2) remain silent. The round in which
the shares of the actual secret are revealed and hence
the secret is reconstructed is called revelation or defini-
tive round. When the dealer is offline, players are made
aware that they have crossed the revelation round by the
reconstruction or exchange of an indicator (a bit in [14],
a signal in [12]). For simultaneous channel model, par-
ties can identify a revelation round as soon as it occurs.
However, for non-simultaneous channels, the indication is
delayed till the subsequent round to avoid rushing strat-
egy. In this case, the indicator cannot be reconstructed
or interpreted by all the players. The player who com-
municates last during the reconstruction of the indicator
is the first and only one to know that the last round
was the revelation round. Once he comes to know this,
he has no incentive to send his share of the indicator to
the other players for reconstruction. Instead, he simply
quits. The fact that this player quits signals to the other
players that the secret has been reconstructed.
A (t, n) rational secret reconstruction protocol is a
pair (Γ,−→σ )t,n, where Γ is the game (i.e., specification
of allowable actions) and −→σ =(σ1, . . . , σn) denotes the
strategies followed by the players. We use the nota-
tions −→σ −i = (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σn) and (σ′i,−→σ −i) =
(σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ
′
i, σi+1, . . . , σn). The outcome of the game
is denoted by −→o ((Γ,−→σ )t,n)=(o1, . . . , on). The outcomes
of a secret reconstruction game Γ with respect to a party
Pi are as follows: 1) Pi obtains the secret while others do
not; 2) everybody obtains the secret; 3) nobody obtains
the secret 4) others obtain the secret while Pi does not
and 5) others believe in a fake secret while Pi does not.
The output that no secret is obtained is denoted by ⊥
and fake secret is denoted by any symbol /∈ {s,⊥}.
A. Utilities and Preferences
The utility function ui of each party Pi is defined over
the set of possible outcomes of the game. The outcomes
and corresponding utilities for t = n = 2 are described in
Table I. For classical secret sharing, ui is assumed to be
polynomial in the security parameter k which is typically
the size of the secret. Thus, UTNi = ui(1
k, (oi = s, oj =⊥
)), UTTi = ui(1
k, (oi = s, oj = s)) (where i 6= j) and so
on.
TABLE I: Outcomes and Utilities for (2, 2) rational secret
reconstruction
P1’s outcome P2’s outcome P1’s Utility P2’s Utility
(o1) (o2) U1(o1, o2) U2(o1, o2)
o1=s o2=s U
TT
1 U
TT
2
o1=⊥ o2=⊥ U
NN
1 U
NN
2
o1=s o2=⊥ U
TN
1 U
NT
2
o1=⊥ o2=s U
NT
1 U
TN
2
o1=⊥ o2 6∈ {s,⊥} U
NF
1 U
FN
2
o1 6∈ {s,⊥} o2=⊥ U
FN
1 U
NF
2
For quantum domain, the secret is a state |ψ〉 = α |0〉+
β |1〉, or in other words, a pair of complex numbers (α, β).
Thus, the size of the secret is effectively infinite. Hence,
the assumption on the utilities as polynomial functions of
the security parameter has no meaning. Rather, we treat
4the utilities as real numbers that depend on the output
values.
Players have their preferences based on the different
possible outcomes. In this work, a rational player i is
assumed to have the following preference:
R1 : UTNi > UTTi > UNNi > UNTi .
Some players may have the additional preference
UNFi ≥ UTTi ,
whereas the rest have
UNFi < U
TT
i .
For more than two players, the second superscript Y in
the notation UXYi correspond to any of the other players
(except i itself).
B. Fairness
A rational player, being selfish, desires an unfair out-
come, i.e., obtaining the secret alone. Therefore, the ba-
sic aim of rational secret sharing schemes has been to
achieve fairness. A formal definition of fairness in the
context of a (2,2) RSS protocol was presented by Asharov
and Lindell [11]. We modify this definition for the (t, n)
quantum setting as follows:
Definition 1. (Fairness, adapted from [11]) A rational
secret reconstruction mechanism (Γ,−→σ )t,n is said to be
completely fair if for every arbitrary alternative strategy
σ′i followed by party Pi, (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) the following
holds:
Pr[oi(Γ, (σ
′
i,
−→σ −i)) = s] < Pr[o−i(Γ, (σ′i,−→σ −i)) = s].
In the above definition, the subscript −i denotes all
the players other than i.
Fairness can be achieved by a suitable randomized re-
construction of the protocol. The exact round in which
the actual secret is to be revealed is not known to the
parties. In Theorem 3, we show that the condition for
fairness is
γUTNi + (1− γ)UNNi < UTTi .
Or, γ <
UTTi − UNNi
UTNi − UNNi
for each i. This is the same condition that is required in
the classical scenario.
C. Correctness
A formal definition of correctness in the context of a
(2,2) RSS protocol was presented by Asharov and Lin-
dell [11]. We modify this definition for the (t, n) quantum
setting as follows:
Definition 2. (Correctness) A rational secret recon-
struction mechanism (Γ,−→σ ) is said to be correct if for
every arbitrary alternative strategy σ′i followed by party
Pi, (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) the following holds:
Pr[o−i(Γ, (σ
′
i,
−→σ −i)) 6∈ {s,⊥}] = 0
In classical rational secret sharing, the condition of
correctness becomes significant in the non-simultaneous
channel model. The rational party with preference R1
communicating last in any round may quit early in the
protocol. Since other parties decide whether the revela-
tion round has been reached depending on whether the
last party has quit, they are easily misled into believing
in a wrong value of the secret.
D. Equilibrium
A rational secret reconstruction protocol should be
such that no player has any incentive to deviate from this
protocol. Consequently, Nash equilibrium and its several
variants have been used as the equilibrium concept in the
literature of rational secret sharing. A suggested strategy−→σ of a mechanism (Γ,−→σ ) is said to be in Nash equilib-
rium when there is no incentive for a player Pi to deviate
from the suggested strategy, given that everyone else is
following this strategy.
The concept of strict Nash equilibrium becomes useful
when the payoffs from playing a ‘good’ strategy and a
‘bad’ strategy are so close that any minor changes in the
beliefs of players about the strategy others are going to
adopt may lead each of them to play the ‘bad’ strategy
[14]. It is defined as follows:
Definition 3. (Strict Nash equilibrium) The suggested
strategy −→σ in the mechanism (Γ,−→σ ) is a strict Nash equi-
librium if for every Pi and for any strategy σ
′
i, we have
ui(σ
′
i,
−→σ −i) < ui(−→σ ).
There may exist several strategies which are the same
as the suggested strategy −→σ i for party Pi except for mi-
nor differences such as performing some irrelevant com-
putation or sending different messages after the protocol
is over. For the sake of proving that a proposed proto-
col is in strict Nash equilibrium, we assume that all such
strategies are essentially the same and do not constitute
any deviation.
III. QUANTUM RATIONAL SECRET SHARING
In this section we first present a (3, 7) quantum rational
secret sharing (QRSS) protocol and we generalize it to
the (t, n) setting in the next section.
We do not exploit the ideas related to teleportation in
quantum secret sharing. The idea of teleportation does
not naturally take care of the situation when parties are
rational. Rather, we use quantum error correcting code.
5There exist some works [21, 33, 36, 37] for building quan-
tum secret sharing schemes using (classical or quantum)
error correcting codes. However, none of these schemes
addresses the rationality issue.
An arbitrary pure single-qubit quantum state is given
by |ψ〉 = α |0〉 + β |1〉 with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, where
α, β ∈ C. Quantum error correction scheme known as
CSS code [38], can be constructed from classical error
correcting code. Let C and C1 be two classical linear
codes such that {0} ⊂ C1 ⊂ C ⊂ F72 with the generator
matrices
G =


1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1

 ,
G1 =


0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1

 .
From the above expression it is clear that C1 is the dual
code [39] of C. A quantum CSS code can be constructed
from these two linear codes with code words |0〉L and
|1〉L. A pure single quantum state can be encoded with
this code by attaching an ancilla state |0〉 and applying
the CNOT gate. After inserting the ancilla state we get
α |00〉+ β |10〉 which is converted to α |00〉+ β |11〉 after
the application of the CNOT gate. |00〉 can be encoded
by the above CSS code as |1〉L and |11〉 can be encoded
as |0〉L. Thus the entire state is encoded as
1√
8
[[α |1111111〉+ |1010010〉+ |1100100〉+ |1001001〉
+ |0000111〉+ |0101010〉+ |0011100〉+ |0110001〉]
+β[|0000000〉+ |0101101〉+ |0011011〉+ |0110110〉
+ |1111000〉+ |1010101〉+ |1100011〉+ |1001110〉]].
In light of the above discussion, let us now explain
our exact proposal and its importance. Here, we assume
the secret as a single qubit α |0〉 + β |1〉. We encode the
secret with the above CSS code. Thus the secret is now
split into seven qubits. The dealer distributes these seven
qubits among seven parties. We now write the secret as
1√
8
[|1111〉 [α |111〉+ β |000〉] + |1010〉 [α |010〉+ β |101〉]
+ |1100〉 [α |100〉+ β |011〉] + |1001〉 [α |001〉+ β |110〉]
+ |0000〉 [α |111〉+ β |000〉] + |0101〉 [α |010〉+ β |101〉]
+ |0011〉 [α |100〉+ β |011〉] + |0110〉 [α |001〉] + β |110〉]].
Applying CNOT gate on last three qubits, we obtain
1√
8
[|1111〉 [α |1〉+ β |0〉] |00〉+ |1010〉 [α |0〉+ β |1〉] |10〉
+ |1100〉 [α |1〉+ β |0〉] |11〉+ |1001〉 [α |0〉+ β |1〉] |01〉
+ |0000〉 [α |1〉+ β |0〉] |00〉+ |0101〉 [α |0〉+ β |1〉] |10〉
+ |0011〉 [α |1〉+ β |0〉] |11〉+ |0110〉 [α |0〉] + β |1〉] |01〉].
Thus if last three parties collaborate, then one can re-
construct the secret by measuring the last two qubits in
{00, 01, 10, 11} basis. If a party gets |00〉 or |11〉, he has
to apply X gate to obtain the secret. If a party gets
|01〉 or |10〉, he has to apply I gate to construct the se-
cret. Close observation reveals that there are only seven
combinations of three parties for which secret can be re-
constructed. Denoting the position of the participants
by integer values, we can write those combinations as
A ={(5, 6, 7), (1, 2, 5), (2, 4, 6), (1, 3, 6), (1, 4, 7), (2, 3, 7),
(3, 4, 7)}. The set A is called the access structure of the
secret sharing scheme.
A. (3,7) Quantum Rational Secret Sharing
Protocol
In classical rational secret sharing, an indicator is dis-
tributed along the shares of each secret to each party.
The parties reconstruct the indicator and comes to know
about the revelation round. However, in quantum do-
main, including an indicator is costly. We solve this prob-
lem by assuming that the dealer is semi-offline. In other
words, the dealer interacts with the participants twice, 1)
at the time of the share distribution, and 2) at the time
when the game is over. In Section V, we discuss how to
make the dealer offline. Like the classical RSS protocols,
our dealer is assumed to be honest.
In classical simultaneous broadcasting channel, each
party is supposed to broadcast his share in each round.
So, in each round, each party obtains (t− 1) shares from
others and thus reconstructs the secret. In the point-to-
point channel model, instead of broadcasting his share,
each party in each round individually communicates his
share to every other party. This means that each party
prepares t copies of his or her share and distributes (t−1)
shares among (t− 1) parties retaining one share for him-
self. In quantum domain, due to the no cloning the-
orem [40], a player cannot generate copies of his share.
However, the dealer can prepare as many copies of the se-
cret as required as he knows the secret. We exploit this
idea to form our protocol. The communication in the
quantum setting is similar to the communication in the
point-to-point channel model. Unlike classical RSS, each
round is further sub divided into sub-rounds. In the ith
sub-round of a round j the participant Pi is given the cur-
rent shares (qubits) by the remaining players. For exam-
ple, in (3, 7) quantum rational secret sharing, in the first
sub-round P2 and P3 give their current shares (qubits) to
P1. In the second sub-round P1 and P3 give their current
shares to P2. In the third sub-round P1 and P2 give their
current shares to P3.
We assume that the players are of fail-stop nature.
This means that they do not send wrong shares. In
each round, a player has just two strategies, either to
send his share or to remain silent. Remaining silent
is equivalent to quit the game. Throughout the paper
whereas we use the word “quit”, we want to mean
6that the player remains silent from the very sub-round
of a round. The dealer is assumed to be honest. We
describe our protocol π3,7QRSS below. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the dealer wishes to
reveal the secret to the parties receiving qubits 5, 6 and
7 and we label them as players P1, P2 and P3 respectively.
[1. Protocol π3,7QRSS ]
1.1 The Dealer’s Protocol π3,7ShareGen:
Input. The quantum secret to be shared using (3, 7)
threshold secret sharing.
1.1.1 Share Generation: The dealer does the
following:
• Chooses the r according to a geometric distribution
G(γ) with parameter γ.
• Generates three copies of each secret (fake as well
as actual) for each round and encodes those in CSS
code discussed above.
• Prepares a list listi of shares for each party Pi such
that:
– Qubits (5, 6, 7) of each secret are given to play-
ers P1, P2, and P3 respectively so that each
party gets three qubits, i.e. P1 possesses three
of 5, P2 has three of 6 and P3 possesses three
of 7 for each round.
– Each list contains 3(r+w) shares, where w is
also chosen according to G(γ).
Output. The dealer distributes listi to party Pi.
1.1.2 Unmasking of Revelation Round π3,7Unmask:
Input. Signal sigi from each player Pi, (i ∈ 1, 2, 3).
Computation and Communication. The dealer
does the following:
• If sig1 = sig2 = sig3 = 1, announces the value of r
to each Pi.
• If for at least one value of i, sigi 6= 1, aborts after
announcing abort to each party Pi.
Output. The dealer outputs either r or abort depending
on the values of sigi.
1.2 The Player’s Protocol
Input. The list of shares listi.
1.2.1 Secret Reconstruction π3,7Recon:
Computation and Communication. Each player Pi
does the following:
• In the ith sub-round of a round j, Pi is given the
current shares (qubits) by other two parties.
• Checks to see if the number of shares received is
less than two. If yes, aborts and sends sigi = 0 to
dealer. Else, continues.
• At the end of round j, does the following:
– Applies CNOT gate considering his current
share (qubit) as control.
– Measures target bits in {00, 01, 10, 11} basis.
– Depending on the measured value operates ei-
ther X gate or I gate.
• Stores the secret sj obtained in the jth round.
• If j = 13 |listi|, sends sigi = 1 to the dealer. If the
dealer sends abort, then aborts; else if the dealer
sends the value of r stores only sr and quits. If
j < 13 |listi|, continues.
Output. The quantum secret sr.
IV. GENERALIZATION TO (t, n) QUANTUM
RATIONAL SECRET SHARING
Before going to the (t, n) quantum rational secret shar-
ing, first we show an existential result.
Theorem 1. Let C = [n, k, d] and C1 = [n, k − 1, d′] be
two linear codes such that C1 ⊂ C. Given C · CT1 = 0,
there is always a secret sharing scheme provided k is a
power of 2.
Proof. From the definition it is clear that we always con-
struct a CSS code from given C and C1 with codewords
|0〉L and |1〉L. Let the secret be α |0〉+β |1〉. Let us take
the tensor product of the secret and (m − 1) number of
the ancilla states, wherem is any integer value. The final
state becomes α |0102 . . . 0m〉+ β |1102 . . . 0m〉.
Applying CNOT gate we obtain α |0102 . . . 0m〉 +
β |1112 . . . 1m〉. |0102 . . . 0m〉 can be written in matrix
form by a 2m binary vector, (100 . . .00). Similarly
|1112 . . . 1m〉 can be represented by a 2m binary vector,
(000 . . .01). In secret sharing scheme |0102 . . . 0m〉 and
|1112 . . . 1m〉 are message states. Thus k = 2m or m =
log2 k. As m is an integer, k should be power of 2. The
encoded secret in CSS code becomes α |1〉L + β |0〉L.
The next result gives a bound on the number of parties
that can reconstruct the secret.
Theorem 2. Let C = [n, k, d] and C1 = [n, k − 1, d′] be
two linear codes such that C1 ⊂ C. Given C · CT1 = 0,
there are minimum d number of parties who can recon-
struct the secret.
Proof. According to the definition of the CSS
code, |0〉L = 1‖C1‖
∑
x∈C1
|x+ C1〉 and |1〉L =
1
‖C1‖
∑
x/∈C1
|x+ C1〉. Thus, the codewords which
consist the codeword |0〉L belong to C1. On the other
hand, the codewords consisting the codeword |1〉L belong
to C/C1. So we always get two orthogonal codewords
which come from two different cosets. One codeword
is associated with α and other codeword is associated
7with β. Let they be u and v. Since dist(u − v) ≥ d,
if we apply CNOT gate on these d bits considering the
first bit as control, we get (d − 1) target bits which
are equal in both the codewords. So measuring those
(d − 1) qubits in {0, 1}(d−1) basis we can reconstruct
the secret depending on the measurement result. Thus,
for secret reconstruction minimum d parties have to
collaborate.
Note that since C1 ⊂ C, we must have d′ ≥ d. For
(t, n) QRSS, we set t = d.
A. t-out-of-n Quantum Rational Secret Sharing
Protocol
Let us now present our generalized scheme.
[2. Protocol πt,nQRSS ]
2.1 The Dealer’s Protocol πt,nShareGen:
Input. The quantum secret to be shared using (t, n)
threshold secret sharing.
2.1.1 Share Generation: The dealer does the follow-
ing:
• The dealer designates t players among n, from the
access structure.
• Chooses the r according to a geometric distribution
G(γ) with parameter γ.
• Generates t copies of each secret (fake as well as
actual) for each round and encodes those in CSS
code derived from C and C1 (see Theorem 2).
• Prepares a list listi of shares for each party Pi such
that:
– Each player Pi is given a qubit from a valid
set of t qubits from the access structure like
(3, 7) QRSS.
– Each list contains t(r + w) shares, where w is
also chosen according to G(γ).
Output. The dealer distributes listi to party Pi.
2.1.2 Unmasking of Revelation Round πt,nUnmask:
Input. Signal sigi from each player Pi, (i ∈ 1, . . . , t).
Computation and Communication. The dealer
does the following:
• If sigi = 1 for all i ∈ 1, . . . , t, announces the value
of r to each Pi.
• If for at least one value of i, sigi 6= 1, aborts after
announcing abort to each party Pi.
Output. The dealer outputs either r or abort depending
on the values of sigi.
2.2 The Player’s Protocol
Input. The list of shares listi.
2.2.1 Secret Reconstruction πt,nRecon:
Each player Pi does the following:
• In the ith sub-round of a round j, Pi is given the
current shares (qubits) by other (t− 1) players.
• Checks to see if the number of shares received is
less than (t− 1). If yes, aborts and sends sigi = 0
to dealer. Else, continues.
• At the end of round j, does the following:
– Applies CNOT gate considering his current
share (qubit) as control.
– Measures target bits in {0, 1}(t−1) basis.
– Depending on the measured value operates ei-
ther X gate or I gate.
• Stores the secret sj obtained in the jth round.
• If j = 1t |listi|, sends sigi = 1 to the dealer. If the
dealer sends abort, then aborts; else if the dealer
sends the value of r stores only sr and quits. If
j < 1t |listi|, continues.
Output. The quantum secret sr.
In the next result, we show that the fairness condition
for classical domain remains valid in the quantum domain
as well.
Theorem 3. If γ > 0 and UTTi > γU
TN
i +(1− γ)UNNi ,
the protocol πt,nQRSS achieves fairness.
Proof. A player who wants to obtain the secret alone
must be able to correctly guess which round is the rev-
elation round. Suppose the ith player guesses that the
jth round is the revelation round and quits in the ith
sub-round of the jth round. On other words, the player
remains silent from the (i+1)th sub-round of jth round.
Our protocol is designed in such a way that if any player
quits in any intermediate round, then it is reported to
the dealer by a signal bit (sig). If for at least one value
of i, sigi 6= 1, the dealer aborts after announcing abort
to each party Pi.Thus, if the guess of the ith player is
correct i.e j = r,the probability of which is γ, his utility
is UTNi , else his utility is U
NN
i . So the expected utility
of the player who decides to deviate based on his guess is
given by γUTNi + (1− γ)UNNi . On the other hand, if he
simply followed the protocol, his utility would have been
UTTi . However, the dealer chooses the value γ in such a
way so that
γUTNi + (1− γ)UNNi < UTTi .
Thus the player should have no incentive to deviate. He
always gives his share and hence the protocol achieves
fairness.
The next result establishes the correctness of our gen-
eral scheme.
8Theorem 4. Even if some players may have UNFi ≥
UTTi , the protocol π
t,n
QRSS achieves correctness.
Proof. In our protocol, the dealer is semi-offline. The
revelation round is unmasked by him after all the play-
ers report that the reconstruction game is over. There-
fore, players do not depend on the action of the last
player to know which round is the revelation round (see
section II C). Thus, the protocol is UNFi independent.
No player has any incentive to quit in an intermediate
round in the purpose to make the others believe in a fake
secret as actual secret. Hence the protocol is correct.
Note that in [11], it is mentioned that for non-
simultaneous channel model, UNFi independence is im-
possible. But there the underlying assumption is that
the dealer is offline. Since in our QRSS, the dealer is
semi-offline, we can easily get UNFi independence even
in non-simultaneous channel.
Now, we can state the following result on equilibrium.
Theorem 5. If γ > 0 and UTTi > γU
TN
i +(1− γ)UNNi ,
then protocol πt,nQRSS achieves strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us assume that a party Pi follows the deviating
strategy σ′i, when all other parties follow the protocol.
Suppose Pi aborts at round j and the revelation round is
r. Then either j is itself the revelation round, i.e., r = j
or it is a round before the revelation round, i.e. r > j. In
our case, the secret reconstruction game is played until
each party exhausts his list of shares. After that the
dealer points out the revelation round. Hence, there is
a possibility that Pi deviates after the revelation round,
i.e., r < j although such deviation is not helpful in any
way to the deviating party. We assume that the correct
secret can be obtained by a player only when he quits
in the revelation round. From the property of geometric
distribution, we have
γ = Pr[j = r|j ≤ r] = Pr[j=r]Pr[j≤r] , and
1− γ = Pr[j < r|j ≤ r] = Pr[j<r]Pr[j≤r] .
Then, ui(σ
′
i,
−→σ −i) is given by
UTNi Pr[j = r] + U
NN
i Pr[j < r] + U
TT
i Pr[j > r]
= γUTNi Pr[j ≤ r] + (1− γ)UNNi Pr[j ≤ r]
+UTTi (1− Pr[j ≤ r])
= (γUTNi + (1− γ)UNNi − UTTi ) Pr[j ≤ r] + UTTi
< UTTi .
The last inequality follows from our assumption that
γUTNi + (1 − γ)UNNi < UTTi , which makes the term
added to UTTi negative. In each sub-round, a player can
send only a unique share (namely, the correct share) as
we have ui(σ
′
i,
−→σ −i) < ui(−→σ ). So, our protocol follows
strict Nash equilibrium.
In the classical rational secret sharing domain, Halpern
and Teague [9] claimed that (2,2) rational secret shar-
ing scheme cannot be constructed. Later, Gordon and
Katz [13] showed a general (t, n) rational secret sharing
that works for n = t = 2, thus refuting the claim of [9].
Our (t, n) quantum rational secret sharing scheme also
works for t = 2. In that case, we require [n, k, 2] linear
code to construct the CSS code. In principle, (2, n) QSS
is the quantum analogue of (2, 2) classical secret sharing,
since in the quantum domain the dealer designates, from
the access structures, a specific subset of 2 players (out
of n) except whom no one else can obtain the secret.
V. OFFLINE DEALER FOR QRSS
In this section, we propose a (t, n) quantum rational
secret sharing scheme with the dealer offline, i.e., after
distributing the shares, the dealer does not come into
the picture.
Considering the dealer as semi-offline, we have shown
that our protocol πt,nQRSS becomes U
NF independent and
hence correct. In [11], it is shown that in case of offline
dealer and non-simultaneous channel model, the protocol
becomes UNF dependent. Hence, achieving correctness
is not guaranteed, when the preferences of the players are
defined by R1. Thus, in case of offline dealer, to achieve
correctness (which we show later), we suitably redefine
the preferences of the players as follows:
R2 : UTNi > UTTi > UNNi > UNTi ,
and
UNFi < U
TT
i
for all players i. Note that we have to restrict the utilities
so that no player can have UNFi ≥ UTTi .
In our protocol πt,nQRSSDO below, we use a Boolean
indicator variable b associated with each round. The
secret bit b is distributed among the designated t parties
through a (t, t) Shamir secret sharing to denote whether
the previous round was revelation round (b = 1) or not
(b = 0). Later, we discuss how to move from classical
indicator to quantum indicator.
[3. Protocol πt,nQRSSDO]
3.1 The Dealer’s Protocol πt,nShareGen:
Input. The quantum secret to be shared using (t, n)
threshold secret sharing.
3.1.1 Share Generation: The dealer does the
following:
• Sets t = d and designates t players among n.
• Chooses the r according to a geometric distribution
G(γ) with parameter γ.
• Generates t copies of each secret (fake as well as
actual) for each round and encodes those in CSS
code derived from C and C1 (see Theorem 2).
9• Prepares a list listi of shares for each party Pi such
that:
– Each element ek,i in the list listi consists of
two parts: a qubit from a valid set of t qubits
from the access structure as in (3, 7) QRSS
and a (t, t) Shamir share of a Boolean value
indicating whether the previous round was the
revelation round.
– Each list contains k = t(r + w) shares, where
w is also chosen according to G(γ).
3.2 The Player’s Protocol
Input. The list of shares listi.
3.2.1 Secret Reconstruction πt,nRecon:
Each player Pi does the following:
• In the ith sub-round of a round j, Pi is given the
current element (one qubit and one classical bit) in
the lists by other (t− 1) players.
• If the number of elements received is less than (t−
1) or if a partial element has been received then
aborts. Else, continues.
• At the sub-round i of round j, does the following:
– Stores the qubits obtained from the (t − 1)
parties.
– Reconstruct the Boolean value b associated
with that round.
– If b = 1,
∗ Set r = (j − 1).
∗ Applies CNOT gate considering his (j −
1)th share (qubit) as control.
∗ Measures target bits in {0, 1}(t−1) basis.
∗ Depending on the measured value oper-
ates either X gate or I gate.
∗ Stores the quantum secret sr obtained in
the (j − 1)th round.
Else, continues.
Output. The quantum secret sr.
We can make the above protocol fully quantum by
replacing the indicator bits 0 and 1 by qubits |0〉 and |1〉
respectively. However, instead of Shamir’s (t, t) share,
|0〉 and |1〉 are encoded by CSS code just like the secret
state s. The dealer distributes the list (listi) to each
player Pi, containing two qubits, first one for the secret
and the second one for the round. In each sub-round i
of a round j, player Pi reconstructs the qubit associated
with that round. If it is |1〉, the player comes to know
that the (j − 1)th round was the revelation round. He
reconstructs the secret for the (j − 1)th round and
discards other qubits obtained in the previous rounds.
Note that unlike the protocol for semi-offline dealer,
the game will be over when the first player gets 1 (in
classical) or |1〉 (in quantum). He has no incentive to
send his shares in subsequent sub-rounds. He then just
quits the game. The rest of the players then conclude
that the revelation round has been occurred just before
that round. Thus they also get the secret by operating
CNOT gate and measuring the target bits for the last
complete round.
Unlike semi-offline dealer, in this case the players need
not to reconstruct the secret qubits for each round. In-
stead, they reconstruct the secret only for the revelation
round. Moreover, the players are not forced to exhaust
their lists of shares. The revelation round is the last
round in this protocol as after the revelation round the
players have no incentive to continue the game. The pro-
tocol is fair, correct and achieves strict Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6. If γ > 0 and UTTi > γU
TN
i +(1− γ)UNNi ,
the protocol πt,nQRSSDO achieves fairness.
The proof is the same as Theorem 3.
Theorem 7. Provided UTTi > U
NF
i , the protocol
πt,nQRSSDO achieves correctness.
Proof. As UTTi > U
NF
i , no player has any incentive to
mislead others to believe in a wrong secret as an actual
secret when he himself does not get the real secret. Thus
the protocol is correct.
We show strict Nash equilibrium in the next result.
Theorem 8. If γ > 0 and UTTi > γU
TN
i +(1− γ)UNNi ,
then protocol πt,nQRSSDO achieves strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us assume that a party Pi follows the deviating
strategy σ′i, when all other parties follow the protocol.
Suppose Pi aborts at round j and the revelation round is
r. Then either j is itself the revelation round, i.e., r = j
or it is a round before the revelation round, i.e., r > j.
We assume that the correct secret can be obtained by a
player only when he quits in the revelation round. From
the property of geometric distribution, we have
γ = Pr[j = r|j ≤ r] = Pr[j=r]Pr[j≤r] , and
1− γ = Pr[j < r|j ≤ r] = Pr[j<r]Pr[j≤r] .
Then, ui(σ
′
i,
−→σ −i) is given by
UTNi Pr[j = r] + U
NN
i Pr[j < r]
= γUTNi Pr[j ≤ r] + (1− γ)UNNi Pr[j ≤ r]
= (γUTNi + (1− γ)UNNi ) Pr[j ≤ r]
< UTTi .
The last inequality follows from our assumption that
γUTNi +(1−γ)UNNi < UTTi . In each sub-round, a player
can send only a unique share (namely, the correct share)
as we have ui(σ
′
i,
−→σ −i) < ui(−→σ ). So, our protocol follows
strict Nash equilibrium.
Note that the proof in this case is a bit different from
the proof in Theorem 5, because the case r < j does not
occur here.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Quantum secret sharing schemes either derived from
QECC or teleportation do not succeed when we assume
rational players. In this paper, for the first time we pro-
pose a new quantum rational secret sharing schemes that
is fair, correct and achieves strict Nash equilibrium. Un-
der this scheme, we propose two protocols, one with semi-
offline dealer and the other with offline dealer. Semi-
offline dealer appears twice 1) at the time of the share
distribution, 2) at the end of the game. In the second
protocol, we make the dealer offline by giving the players
auxiliary information related to the revelation round.
The only disadvantage of the protocols is that they re-
quire quantum memory. Also, quantum no cloning the-
orem [40] resists the players to copy their shares. So
we let the dealer can prepare the copies of the secret as
he knows the secret. Removing the requirement of the
quantum memory is an interesting open problem.
In the classical rational secret sharing schemes, there
are other notions of Nash equilibrium, such as computa-
tional Nash equilibrium under different adversarial mod-
els [12, 16, 17, 41]. Due to CSS code structure, no cloning
and infinite range of the secret, the scenario is completely
different in quantum setting and hence we consider only
strict Nash equilibrium. Extended analysis of our pro-
tocol or its variants for alternative equilibrium models
could be another potential future work.
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